Will there be another human influenza pandemic? The certainty is that there will be, and the probability is that the virus will emerge from Eurasian aquatic bird reservoirs and involve reassortment between a human and avian strain, with accumulation of mutations or true recombinational events (or both) that will permit spread and pathogenicity among humans. This process will probably occur in pigs because they possess receptors for both avian and human influenza viruses, and emergence may occur in southern China. Prediction of the subtype is impossible, but there is a hypothesis based on seroarcheology that only H1, H2, and H3 subtypes can infect humans; however, it is arguable that H7 or H2 strains might be equally capable of infecting humans.
As the world prepares for the next pandemic of human influto them. On the basis of the historical record of this century, it is probable that only the H1, H2, and H3 subtypes affect enza, the scientific community is looking for indicators of the imminence of this event. Certain predictions can be made on humans; however, it cannot be assumed with certainty that only these subtypes can cause human pandemics. I will begin the basis of knowledge accumulated since 1933, when influenza A viruses were first isolated: the certainty that there will be with the assumption that the other subtypes (H4 -H15) cannot be excluded and with the certainty that a human pandemic can another human pandemic, the probability that the precursor will be of Eurasian avian origin, and how and where this may be anticipated and that its occurrence becomes more imminent with time. occur. It is not possible to say when the pandemic will occur, just that likelihood increases proportionally with time. Herein, I will consider each of these predictions; however, time will
The Probabilities for the Origins of Pandemics be the arbiter.
Eurasian origin. The primordial source of all influenza A viruses in mammals and domestic avian species is the aquatic The Certainty bird reservoirs, in which each of the known subtypes are perpetuated [2] . These avian viruses can be divided into two different The purpose of this report is to examine the available inforpopulations, one in Eurasia and one in the Americas. Evidence mation about the source of and the mechanisms involved in indicates that human influenza pandemics of this century origihuman influenza pandemics and to utilize the antigenic and nated from the Eurasian avian lineage. Epidemiologic evidence molecular information accumulated over the past 50 years to supports the proposition that the Asian/57 (H2N2), Hong Kong/ make predictions about future pandemics. Information from 68 (H3N2), and Russian/77 (H1N1) viruses all originated from historical records, seroarcheology, and molecular epidemiology China. Phylogenetic studies suggest that the catastrophic [1] indicates that there will be another influenza pandemic ''Spanish'' influenza of 1918 may also have been of Eurasian among humans. It has been Ç28 years since the Hong Kong/ origin [3] and raise the question of whether the precursors of 68 (H3N2) pandemic appeared in humans and 19 years since the outbreak were of American or Asian origin. Since the high the Russian influenza strain (H1N1) reemerged in 1977. As mortality associated with the epidemic occurred in the second judged by the reappearance of H1 after an absence of 27 years, year of viral spread [4] , it is possible that the virus originated there are enough susceptible people to support a pandemic of in Asia and spread to North America before it became highly the H2 subtype. Representatives of other influenza subtypes lethal in humans. (H4 -H15) that have not infected humans for at least 100 years Both the Asian/57 (H2N2) and Hong Kong/68 (H3N2) panmight also cause a pandemic since humans have no immunity demics originated by reassortment. In 1957, the Asian pandemic virus acquired three genes (for PB1, hemagglutinin [HA] , and neuraminidase) from the avian influenza gene pool in wild ducks by genetic reassortment and retained five other S15 JID 1997;176 (Suppl 1)
Pandemic Influenza: Predictions quasispecies [9] , which consist of collections of virion RNAs with slightly divergent nucleotide sequences. This enormous genetic plasticity can result in genetic drift in all gene products, including antigenic drift in the surface glycoproteins; host range variation; and alterations in the severity of disease pathogenicity. The segmented nature of the influenza virus genome also permits genetic shift. As noted above, genetic shift was responsible for the generation of the Asian/57 (H2N2) and Hong Kong/68 (H3N2) pandemics (figure 1). Genetic recombination of influenza virus is a much rarer event but has been demonstrated in RNA viruses, notably in coronaviruses and alphaviruses [10] . Nonhomologous recombination has also been demonstrated for influenza viruses [11] . Recombination resulting in increased cleavability and pathogenicity has also been demonstrated between chicken host cell 28S rRNA and the HA of A/turkey/Oregon/71 (H7N3) [12] . In addition, a variant of A/seal/Mass/1/80 (H7N7) influenza virus had a 60-nucleotide insertion in the HA gene that probably originated from the NP gene and increased the host range nucleotide insert of our Australian H15 viruses to any viral or cellular gene, but nonhomologous recombination between viral and cellular RNA may have led to the insertion. Since the H15 containing the insertion is translated into a stable surface lian strains, show low evolutionary rates [6] . In fact, influenza viruses in aquatic birds appear to be in evolutionary stasis, with glycoprotein, this example emphasizes the possible importance of RNA recombination in creating genetic diversity among no evidence of net evolution over the past 60 years. Nucleotide changes have continued to occur at a similar rate in avian and influenza viruses. Although recombination in influenza viruses appears to be a rare event, it is still a potentially important mammalian influenza viruses; however, these changes do not result in amino acid changes in the avian viruses, but all eight mechanism in the evolution of human pandemic viruses.
Where? -Do influenza pandemics originate in China? Hismammalian influenza gene segments continue to accumulate changes in amino acids. The high level of genetic conservation torical records and the appearance of the Asian, Hong Kong, and Russian pandemic strains of influenza virus in China sugsuggests that avian viruses are approaching or have reached an adaptive optimum, wherein nucleotide changes provide no gest that most pandemics of human influenza since about 1850 have originated in China. The exception seems to be Spanish selective advantage. It also means that the source of genes for pandemic influenza viruses exists phenotypically unchanged in influenza, which may have originated in military camps in Kansas and subsequently spread to Europe by US troops in the aquatic bird reservoir.
Overall, the most important implication from phylogenetic 1918 [4] ; however, as considered above, it is also possible that this virus originated in Eurasia. studies is that the ancestral viruses that caused the Spanish influenza in 1918 and the viruses that provided gene segments
The possibility has been raised that southern China is an influenza epicenter [15] . The farming practices [16] If recycling occurs, then H2 will probably be the subtype that causes the next human pandemic. It has been Ç28 years H2, and H4 subtypes predominate in wild aquatic birds in this region [18] , while H3, H4, and H6 predominate in domestic since the H2 subtype last infected humans, and as determined on the basis of the reappearance of H1 after an absence of 27 poultry in southern China [19] . It is important to note that the distribution of influenza virus subtypes has never been years, there are enough susceptible people to support a pandemic. Influenza viruses of the H2 subtype have continued to established in wild aquatic birds in China or Southeast Asia, but studies over 25 years in the former USSR established that circulate in the aquatic avian reservoir [23] , the HA of which is essentially unchanged from that of the viruses that affected all known subtypes, including H1, H2, and H3, were commonly isolated from water birds, including ducks, gulls, terns, and humans in 1957. During 1994 -1995, H2N2 virus was isolated 49 times from live-bird markets and poultry in the United States sandpipers [20] . Studies on the frequency of transfer of avian influenza viruses or gene segments to humans in China have (Senne D., personal communication). Do these viruses have the capacity to infect humans, including immunosuppressed been limited, and preliminary serologic studies suggest that interspecies transmission probably occurs [21] ; however, there individuals, or swine? There is no convincing evidence for the detection of H2 influenza viruses in pigs. Since the Eurasian is no evidence for transfer of avian influenza virus gene segments in interpandemic periods [22] .
lineage of avian influenza viruses has been the source for gene segments that have reassorted with the circulating human viAlthough the above considerations about the regions of the world where influenza pandemics originate are interesting, they ruses to produce the Asian/57 and Hong Kong/68 pandemic strains, we need to know if H2 viruses are currently prevalent are still largely speculative. Only circumstantial evidence exists for the appearance of pandemic influenza viruses in southern in avian species in Eurasia. If the next pandemic in humans is not caused by an H2 virus China. Further studies on influenza in Southeast Asia are necessary to determine whether an epicenter does exist in this region, subtype, then which of the remaining subtypes (H4 -H15) are possibilities? H7 might cause a pandemic, for it is known to whether the next human pandemic strains can be isolated from lower animals (e.g., pigs), and whether the next pandemic will infect mammals. H7N7 was 1 of 2 influenza A strains that caused epidemics in horses, and it has also infected seals and occur first in this region of the world.
What? -Which subtype of influenza A will cause the next caused conjunctivitis in humans [1] . Preliminary studies have found antibodies to subtype H7 in humans in China [21] . Other human pandemic? Serologic and virologic evidence suggest that since 1889 there have been six introductions of a virus subtypes, including H4, have been isolated from seals [24] , and H10 has been isolated from minks; however, these strains bearing an HA subtype that had been absent from the human population for some time: Three human subtypes have appeared have not become established in these species. Other subtypes seem less likely to cause a pandemic among humans, despite and reappeared cyclically, beginning with the sequential emergence of the virus subtypes H2 in 1889, H3 in 1900, and H1 their high prevalence in aquatic birds throughout the world / 9d2e$$au04 06-30-97 17:11:40 jinfa UC: J Infect (H4, H3, and H6 predominate in aquatic birds in China [19] experiment'' was conducted to determine the fate of an avirulent virus after repeated cycles of replication in millions of and North America, and H1, H2, and H4 predominate in Europe chickens. By the end of 1994, the virus had mutated to contain [18] ). a highly cleavable HA but remained only mildly pathogenic in chickens. Within months, however, it had become lethal in poultry. Nucleotide sequence analysis of the HA cleavage site The Emergence of ''New'' Influenza Viruses in Lower of the original avirulent strain revealed a sequence (RETR) Animals and Birds typical of avirulent viruses and unlike the sequence (KKKR) Periodically, influenza viruses in the aquatic bird reservoir that characterized viruses responsible for the 1983 outbreak in spread to swine, horses, domestic poultry, and sea mammals US poultry. The highly pathogenic isolates contained insertions [2], causing major outbreaks of infections ranging in severity and substitutions in the HA connecting peptide, RKRKTR, from inapparent to severe. In lower animals, the entire virus which made the HA highly cleavable in trypsin-free chicken is often transmitted without reassortment to the new host, as embryo fibroblasts. Phylogenetic analysis of the HA of H5 typified by a recent example of the emergence in chickens of avian influenza viruses, including the Mexican isolates, india highly pathogenic influenza virus from the aquatic bird resercated that the epidemic virus originated from the introduction voir [25] . In October of 1993, there was decreased egg producof a single virus of the North American lineage into Mexican tion and increased mortality among Mexican chickens in assochickens. This sequence of events demonstrates the step-wise ciation with serologic evidence of an H5N2 influenza virus acquisition of virulence by an avian influenza virus in nature. (figure 3). First isolated from chickens in May of 1994, after Until a decision is made to eradicate H5N2 virus from Mexispreading widely in the country, the virus caused only a mild can poultry, the field experiment continues, with three possible respiratory syndrome in specific pathogen -free chickens. Eradoutcomes. First, it is possible that both nonpathogenic and ication of the virus would have required the destruction of pathogenic viruses will continue to spread in Mexico and interinfected birds, a step that was not taken because it would have nationally. Second, an effective vaccination and biosecurity program might eradicate currently circulating nonpathogenic devastated the poultry industry in Mexico. Therefore, a ''field pathogenicity of human influenza viruses and why one strain is and pathogenic forms of the virus; however, this seems unlikely more pathogenic than another.
since the avirulent virus that is adapted to chickens spreads very effectively and causes minimal primary evidence of infection. Third, it is possible that the pathogenic variants will be selfConclusions limiting and will not be maintained; however, if the avirulent Given the certainty that there will be another pandemic of form is allowed to continue circulating, it is inevitable that human influenza, we must devote as much effort and as many there will be periodic outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian resources as necessary to draw up a defense strategy and a influenza.
battle plan for dealing with what could be a potential catastroThus, influenza A viruses continue to emerge from the phe. Since an H2 Eurasian avian influenza virus may be the aquatic bird reservoir to cause disease of various degrees of precursor of a future human pandemic originating in China, it severity. These outbreaks in lower animals and birds serve to is recommended that the frequency of H2 isolates in aquatic remind us that it is only a matter of time before another influbirds and any evidence of H2 or other avian influenza viruses enza pandemic occurs among humans.
in pigs and humans be determined in China.
If we assume that people, pigs, and aquatic birds are the Direct or Indirect Spread principal variables associated with the interspecies transfer of influenza virus and the emergence of new human pandemic There is an increasing amount of information suggesting that strains, it may be possible to influence the occurrence of human pigs may be the intermediate host or ''mixing vessel'' for the pandemics of influenza. Live-bird markets that house a wide spread of avian influenza virus to humans [26, 27] . This subject variety of avian species (chickens, ducks, turkeys, pheasants, is extensively reviewed elsewhere in this supplement. There is and guinea fowl) and occasionally pigs together for sale directly convincing evidence for interspecies spread of swine, avian, to the public provide outstanding conditions for genetic mixing and human influenza viruses and for genetic reassortment of and spreading of influenza viruses. Monitoring of the birds the virus in pigs; thus, there is convincing evidence that the entering these markets for influenza could provide information pig probably provides one avenue for the transfer of H1N1 and on prevalent subtypes. If pigs are the mixing vessel for influ-H3N2 influenza virus genes to humans. enza viruses, then monitoring them for evidence of avian influThere is also evidence that turkeys in the United States can enza viruses, particularly of H2 subtypes, might provide an be infected with classical H1N1 swine influenza viruses and early warning of what might occur in humans. Finally, it is that these viruses can reassort with avian strains [28] . There is recommended that serologic surveillance of humans in contact no evidence yet that these viruses spread directly to humans; with animals should be done regularly, particularly in Southeast however, it could be envisioned that they might spread through Asia. pigs to humans.
At this time, there is no evidence for or against the direct spread of avian influenza viruses to humans. The sialic acid
